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SOCial iNEQualiTY, POVErTY  
aNd SOCial rEdiSTribuTiON
abSTraCT
In this essay, I review developments in the ongoing debate about the causal 
connections between poverty, personal behaviour and social inequality. I also 
discuss the normative issues that arise in defining poverty and in deciding what 
role redistributive social policies ought to play in its prevention and relief.
I go on to compare the behavioural explanations of the causes of poverty that 
are normatively associated with theories of economic market liberalism and the 
structural explanations that are grounded in theories of socialism and other more 
pluralist forms of social-democratic collectivism.
I conclude that these two unitary ideologies of individualism and collectivism 
are reaching the end of their useful lives as exclusive guides in shaping the ends 
and means of social policies. In democratic societies, compromises have to be made 
between radically different views about what constitutes an equitable distribution 
of wealth and income, and what kind of balance should be struck between the 
claims of freedom and welfare. Viable compromises on these divisive issues can 
only be reached in the mixed economies of democratic pluralist societies.
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bEhaViOural aNd STruCTural mOdElS OF POVErTY
Social inequality, poverty and the redistribution of wealth and income have 
been among the key political issues that have shaped the ends and means 
of social policy over the past fifty years. The ongoing debate about the 
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causes of social inequality and poverty has always been polarised between 
the policy makers and theorists who believe that the poor are largely the 
culpable architects of their own misfortunes and those who believe that 
they are largely the innocent victims of adverse social circumstances and 
changes beyond their control.
The “personal culpability” thesis is based on “behavioural” explana-
tions which attribute the causes of poverty to the personal shortcomings 
of the poor themselves. The very poor are defined as people who lack the 
necessary intelligence, competence or motivation to make sensible choices 
in the management of their daily lives. They grow up in dysfunctional 
families, live dysfunctional lives and pass on their dysfunctional values 
from one generation to the next. They have a marked preference for idle-
ness and would rather live on welfare benefits than work for a living. They 
are the self-perpetuating members of an unregenerate underclass and the 
agents through which the ‘cycle of deprivation’ repeats itself.
From 1834 onwards, the policies of the reformed English Poor law 
were based on behavioural principles regarding the causes of poverty. its 
main cause was seen as the unacceptable moral behaviour of “able-bodied” 
applicants who were deemed able to work but preferred living on poor re-
lief. They were offered relief but only if they agreed to enter a workhouse 
where their conditions of life would be made “less eligible”, or more un-
pleasant, than those of the poorest paid independent labourers outside. in 
this way, what became known as the “workhouse test”, separated the genu-
inely destitute from the workshy. This policy of deterrence was based on 
the assumption that jobs could always be found if people were sufficiently 
motivated to look for them.
The unemployable “non able-bodied” applicants for relief, who were 
mostly old and infirm, were treated differently. If they were judged to be 
destitute, despite having lived sober, thrifty and industrious lives, they 
were classed among the “deserving poor” and would often be granted out-
door relief in their own homes. if they were classed as “undeserving”, they 
would be offered relief but only in the workhouse.
The “victim” thesis is based on “structural” explanations which focus 
on the massive disadvantages that the unequal distribution of wealth, in-
come and life-changes impose on the poorest members of class-based so-
cieties. For the greater part, the very poor are defined as people who are 
forced by adverse circumstances to live out their lives excluded from the 
activities of the societies to which they “belong” only in notional terms. in 
reality, they are a socially excluded underclass.
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From the early twentieth century onwards, structural explanations of 
the causes of poverty became more influential in the making of social poli-
cies and more popular with voters. They played a key role in the gradual 
processes of political change that resulted in the eventual abolition of the 
Poor law and the creation of what came to be called the “welfare state”.
in recent times, policy makers and advisors have grown more circum-
spect in their use of terms like the “deserving” and the “undeserving” 
poor. They do not wish to appear overly patronising or disparaging in their 
judgements about benefit applicants. Nevertheless, in the court of popular 
opinion, many people still believe that such moral distinctions ought to 
be drawn with greater authority and force than is currently the case. They 
remain convinced that those who are able to help themselves ought to re-
ceive substantially less than those who are unable to do so.
a growing number of European governments are also becoming con-
vinced that unemployed benefit claimants ought to be required to enrol in 
work or retraining programmes as a condition of receiving benefit. Failure 
to do so should entail denial or deduction of benefit. We live in more demo-
cratic and humanitarian times and workfare policies have come to be seen 
as morally preferable to workhouse tests.
mOral imPEraTiVES aNd ThE rEliEF OF POVErTY
in their more radical forms, both the “personal culpability” and “structural” 
theses offer uni-causal explanations of the causes of poverty which take 
little or no account of the empirical evidence which shows that poverty is 
a multi-causal phenomenon and that there is no such homogenous entity as 
the poor. The various causes of poverty are interactive over long periods 
of time and, as Paul Spicker points out, “it is possible for them all to apply 
simultaneously” in particular cases (Spicker P., 2006: 71).
Unravelling these causal processes is a difficult task which is just as 
likely to end in accusations of unfair treatment when a person’s entitlement 
to help is confirmed as when it is denied. In any system of exchange rela-
tionships, both welfare recipients and taxpayers, as welfare providers, make 
comparisons and judgements about the relative justice of these outcomes.
most people will readily agree that justice is synonymous with fairness 
but, in the context of welfare exchange relationships, they find it much 
harder to agree on what counts as fairness. Need and desert are the key 
criteria by which welfare entitlements are decided. as moral precepts, 
however, they embody conflicting interpretations of what counts as fair-
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ness and people of different political convictions disagree about which of 
these precepts should carry the greater moral authority in the assessment 
of welfare entitlements.
The concept of poverty itself is also charged with powerful moral con-
notations. as Paul Spicker notes, “poverty consists of serious deprivation 
and people are held to be poor when their material circumstances are de-
clared to be morally unacceptable.” in this respect, he shares david Piach-
aud’s belief that the concept of poverty “carries with it an implication and 
moral imperative that something should be done about it. Its definition is 
a value judgement and should be clearly seen to be so.” (Spicker P., 1999: 
157 and Piachaud d., 1981: 421).
it is not, therefore, surprising that policy makers and advisors seldom 
agree on what should be done about poverty, who should do it and at what 
levels of deprivation it becomes morally imperative that something should 
be done. amartya Sen argues that the most serious and incontestable level 
of deprivation is the condition of absolute poverty when it becomes impos-
sible for people “to meet their nutritional requirements, to escape avoidable 
disease, to be sheltered, to be clothed, to be able to travel, to be educated 
… to live without shame.” Some moralists, however, contend that the un-
deserving poor ought to feel ashamed of the conduct that rendered them 
destitute. Nevertheless, most people would share Sen’s view that there is 
“an irreducible absolutist core in the idea of poverty. if there is starvation 
and hunger then, no matter what the relative picture looks like there clearly 
is poverty.” (Sen a., 1983: 153-169).
Our two explanatory models of the causes of poverty are located on 
what might be called the polar extremes of welfare ideology. relatively 
few policy analysts feel completely at home in these chilly intellectual do-
mains. Most of them, however, attach greater heuristic significance to one 
or other of these models. when governments seek their advice they offer 
more temperate versions of the one which they prefer. The policies which 
they recommend will, therefore, lie somewhere between the political ex-
tremes of left wing collectivism and right wing individualism.
both causal models are moral touchstones of the socio-political theories 
and ideologies that underpin them. Scientific theories set out hypotheses 
about causal relationships in testable forms, not as propositions to be de-
fended but as propositions to be revised, falsified and, if necessary, aban-
doned in response to countervailing evidence (Pinker r., 2004: 78-79).
Social policy theorists often hold strong political and moral beliefs about 
the issues they investigate, notably with regard to the causes of poverty and 
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the ends and means of social policy itself. They develop theories which em-
body normative critiques of the political status quo and policy prescriptions 
for changing it. The distinction between non-normative and normative social 
theories was very clearly drawn by Emile durkheim. he suggested that, “So-
cial theories separate themselves at once into two large categories. One seeks 
only to express what is or what has been; it is purely speculative and scientif-
ic. Others, on the contrary, aim to modify what exists; they propose, not laws, 
but reforms. They are practical doctrines.” (durkheim E., 1967: 51-52).
Normative theorists tell us what will happen if we do x rather than y but 
they also leave us in no doubt as to which option we ought to choose on 
moral grounds. Drawing distinctions between scientific theories, norma-
tive theories and ideologies is a difficult task because it involves matters of 
degree as well as of kind. The first distinction to be drawn is whether or not 
the theory is set out in a testable and falsifiable form. The second concerns 
the degree to which unprejudiced consideration is given to new evidence 
and possible alternative explanations.
as long as there is open debate between open-minded theorists, the 
avenues for falsification and correction will also remain open. The more 
general social theories become, the more likely they are to be overloaded 
with normative convictions and the less likely they are to be presented in 
falsifiable forms. Paradoxically, general theories of radical social change 
tend to be the most resistant to falsification and their advocates most re-
sistant to changing their minds when new evidence challenges their most 
cherished political convictions. For these reasons, general theories of so-
cial change become indistinguishable from ideologies. Scholars test their 
propositions. ideologists defend them against all comers and all counter-
vailing evidence.
The general theories that underpin our explanatory models of poverty 
are based on fundamentally different beliefs concerning the causal links 
between poverty and inequality, the relative importance that should be 
accorded to the criteria of need and desert in the allocation of welfare 
resources and the kinds of distributional relationship that ought to hold be-
tween the principle of equity (or fairness) and the social ideals of equality 
and inequality as policy objectives.
libEral iNdiVidualiSm, SOCial iNEQualiTY aNd POVErTY
behavioural explanations of the causes of poverty are philosophically 
grounded in the classical theories of economic market liberalism. This 
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form of liberalism, or “neo-liberalism” as it is sometimes called, lies fur-
ther to the right of the political spectrum than traditional conservatism. 
This was certainly the case in 1960 when F a hayek –one of the most 
eminent liberal economic theorists of his time– felt it necessary to explain 
why he was not a Conservative.
in hayek’s view, the leading Conservatives of the 1950s had “compro-
mised with socialism and stolen its thunder” by pursuing policies of the 
middle way between the extremes of free-market liberalism and state-reg-
ulated collectivism (hayek F a, 1960: 408, 399). hayek was in no doubt 
that “the most conspicuous attribute of liberalism that distinguishes it as 
much from conservatism as socialism, is that moral beliefs concerning mat-
ters of conduct which do not directly interfere with the protected sphere of 
other persons do not justify coercion” (hayek F a, 1960: 402). The kinds 
of coercion that hayek had in mind were any forms of government regula-
tion and planning that impede “free growth and spontaneous evolution” in 
the context of “the self-regulatory forces of the market” (hayek F a, 1960: 
402, 408).1
The key role of the state was to maintain the rule of law with as little 
arbitrary governmental interference as possible. leaving competitive eco-
nomic markets to the workings of the price mechanism and the “invisible 
hand” of supply and demand would result in a natural reconciliation of 
individual and collective interests and the most efficient allocation of re-
sources under what adam Smith once described as an “obvious and simple 
system of liberty.”
Under conditions of market freedom, the benefits of economic growth 
and wealth creation will trickle down to the poorest members of society 
and the incidence of poverty will diminish. arthur Seldon’s answer to “the 
socialist criticism that the market produces unequal incomes” is that “it 
gives higher rewards to people with exceptional abilities in order to attract 
them to industries where they are scarce.” he goes on to argue that sooner 
or later the free movement of labour actually creates more equality by less-
ening inequalities. removing “the mainly political obstacles to the work 
of the market under capitalism would hasten the rate at which incomes and 
wealth trickled down from the richer to the poorer” and assist in the crea-
1. Similar distinctions can be drawn between and within the two political parties that make 
up the ruling Coalition government in britain today. The Conservative Party is itself a coalition 
of individualist classical liberals and traditional “middle of the road” Tories and the liberal 
democrats have members who would rather be working in coalition with the labour Party.
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tion “of a more egalitarian society based on the natural or acquired ability 
of individuals to enrich one another” (Seldon a., 1990: 196-197).
hayek did not believe that the creation of a more egalitarian society 
was incompatible with the principles of economic market liberalism. he 
saw “no reason why in a free society we should not assure to all protection 
against severe deprivation in the form of an assured minimum income.” 
Such protection should be provided outside the market to “all who cannot 
help themselves” or “are unable to earn in the market an adequate mainte-
nance” (hayek F a, 1982: ii, 87).
in The Road to Serfdom, which was first published in 1944, Hayek sets 
out the terms on which such provisions can be made without endangering 
individual freedoms or undermining libertarian principles. at that time, he 
was greatly alarmed by what he saw as the growing involvement of govern-
ment in the making of economic policy and the collectivist implications of 
the beveridge report’s proposals for social security reform. hayek draws 
a distinction between two kinds of security. The first of these is “security 
against severe physical deprivation, the certainty of a given minimum of 
sustenance for all.” The second kind is “the security of a minimum income 
and the security of the particular income a person is thought to deserve.” 
The first kind of security can be provided for all “outside of and supplemen-
tary to the market system”, while the second can provided “only for some 
and only by controlling or abolishing the market” (hayek F a, 1979: 89).
The first kind of security can, therefore, be guaranteed to all in the form 
of “some minimum of food, shelter and clothing, sufficient to preserve 
health and the capacity to work” without “endangering general freedom.” 
in addition, hayek believed that there was a strong case to be made for 
the state helping to organize a comprehensive system of social insurance 
against “genuinely insurable risks” like “sickness and accidents” (hayek, 
F a, 1979: 90).
The second kind of planning for security, however, posed an insidious 
threat to general freedom because it was designed to protect individuals from 
losses of income “which although in no way deserved yet in a competitive 
society occur daily.” Protecting people from the “vicissitudes of the market” 
in this way would eventually undermine the right to choose one’s employ-
ment, favour one social group at the expense of another and obstruct the free 
play of market forces to everyone’s disadvantage (hayek F a, 1979: 92).
liberals like hayek reject the idea of “social justice” as being “neces-
sarily empty and meaningless” because it can only be achieved by politi-
cal and bureaucratic ordinance. Justice, unfettered by adjectival prefixes 
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of any kind is acting in conformity with the rule of law. This requires 
that “government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced 
beforehand … which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how 
authority will use its coercive power in given circumstances” and for indi-
viduals to plan their own lives on the basis of this knowledge.
by contrast, when governments become overly involved in regulating 
the institutions of civil society and meeting “the actual needs of people 
as they arise”, they are inexorably drawn into deciding how these needs 
should be prioritised and met. Since decisions of this kind “cannot be de-
duced from formal principles of justice” they have to be based on a pro-
liferation of “substantive rules” that “must become part of the law of the 
land” and “the coercive apparatus” which governments of this kind impose 
on their civil societies.
The crucial difference between these two kinds of rule is, in hayek’s view, 
“the same as that between laying down a rule of the road, as in the highway 
Code and ordering people where to go; or … between providing sign posts 
and commanding people which road to take.” hayek places all policies based 
on theories of redistributive social justice in this second category of “substan-
tive” rules (hayek F a, 1982: ii, 87 and hayek F a, 1979: 54-56). 
The idea of social justice can only have meaning in a “command” 
economy and a centrally controlled society. Policies based on principles of 
redistributive social justice constitute “one of the greatest obstacles to the 
elimination of poverty” because they undermine the effective workings of 
the competitive market and wealth creation. in hayek’s view, they have 
“probably produced more injustice in the form of new privileges, obstacles 
to mobility and frustration of efforts than they have contributed to the lot 
of the poor” (hayek F a, 1982: 139-140).
hayek was convinced that, sooner or later, such policies result in the 
breakdown of competitive markets and a slackening in the rate of eco-
nomic growth and wealth creation. in the political sphere, the inexorable 
growth in the regulatory powers of the state deprives us all of our basic 
rights and liberties.
SOCialiSm, COllECTiViSm, SOCial iNEQualiTY  
aNd POVErTY
Structural explanations of the causes of poverty are philosophically ground-
ed in theories of socialism and other more pluralist versions of social-
democratic left wing collectivism. in the classical traditions of marxist and 
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non-marxist socialism, the causes of poverty are attributed to the unequal 
distribution of wealth, income and power that the free play of competitive 
market forces produce in capitalist societies (Freedman r., 1962; marx k. 
and Engels F., 1998 and mcClelland J. S., 1996: 543-612).
in the classical traditions of socialist thought, nothing less than radi-
cal structural change will abolish the economic and social inequalities of 
class-based capitalist societies. Changes of this order will require the na-
tionalisation of the means of production and distribution under a system 
of common ownership, the creation of a centralised command economy 
and radical policies of social redistribution from rich to poor (george V., 
2010: 202-232).
marx and Engels believed that the overthrow of capitalism could only 
be achieved through revolution and the subsequent transition through so-
cialism to an ideal communist society “in which the free development of 
each is the condition for the free development of all” (marx k. and Engels 
F., 1998: 26).
So far, no society has come remotely near to realising this egalitarian 
ideal in the form that marx and Engels envisaged. Their predictions that 
capitalism would eventually collapse under the weight of its own inner 
contradictions have not been vindicated by events. Neither has their belief 
that planned economies would prove to be more efficient and egalitarian 
in the production and distribution of goods and services than competitive 
market economies. (it should be noted, however, that without swift gov-
ernmental intervention, the recent banking crisis might well have ended 
with the near total collapse of the global financial markets.)
an increasing number of democratic socialist and social-democratic 
parties have come to terms with the ethos of competitive markets and rested 
their hopes for achieving more egalitarian societies through the agencies of 
social reform and redistributive social policies. Elements of this collectiv-
ist idealism have also been incorporated into the policies of both liberal 
and conservative parties. They share the view that competitive markets 
work better than planned ones but that they are not perfect and work even 
better when there are effective statutory social services to compensate for 
their imperfections.
T h marshall stands out as the foremost advocate of these kinds of po-
litical compromise between individualist and collectivist policy ends and 
means. in discussing the ends of social policy in his essay, “Value prob-
lems of welfare capitalism”, he separated the abolition of poverty from the 
abolition of inequality, on the grounds that, “Poverty is a tumour which 
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should be cut out, and theoretically should be; inequality is a vital organ 
which is functioning badly” (marshall T h, 1981: 119). he goes on to 
state unequivocally that, “The task of banishing poverty from our ‘ideal 
type’ society must be undertaken jointly by welfare and capitalism, there 
is no other way.” The alternative was an altogether more “totalitarian and 
bureaucratic” type of society (marshall, 1981: 117 and 121).
marshall’s central point is that collectivist social services contribute to 
the general enhancement of social welfare as long as their interventions 
do not subvert the system of competitive markets. in his preferred model 
of “democratic-welfare- capitalism”, his idea of welfare rests on a balance 
struck between the claims of different kinds of right and the satisfaction of 
different kinds of need.
Political, social and economic rights expressed different but comple-
mentary dimensions of welfare which were brought together in the status 
of citizenship. it was not possible “to go on extending any one of these 
rights at the expense of the others without crossing the critical threshold 
at which the relationship between freedom and security becomes one of 
diminishing marginal utility” (Pinker r., 1995: 113).
democratic socialists disagree as to whether marshall’s “ideal type” 
of “democratic-welfare-capitalism” and other similar models of “welfare 
pluralism” should be viewed as morally acceptable compromises between 
individualist and collectivist principles. From a radically left wing per-
spective, the principle of equality should take precedence over that of eco-
nomic freedom because it is the precondition for all our freedoms.
The ends and means of social policy are defined in progressively more 
egalitarian terms as we move further to the left along the party political 
spectrum. in democratic societies, increasing importance is attached to the 
criteria of need in assessing entitlement to welfare benefits. Entitlements 
are endowed with the status of social rights which, in turn, are linked into 
the “idea that full citizenship requires not only the rule of law and political 
democracy, but guaranteed entitlements to social welfare, health care and 
education” (dean h., 2002: 239).
as hartley dean goes on to suggest, “this classic linkage of social jus-
tice to citizenship through the concept of social rights rests on a belief in 
the equal worth of all citizens” (dean h., 2002: 239). People only become 
free in a positive and authentic sense when these basic social rights and 
needs are recognised and met. Egalitarians believe that once these rights 
are met, a positive and complementary relationship will hold between the 
rights to freedom and equality of treatment as citizens. 
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in theory, at least, this degree of egalitarianism might be accommo-
dated within marshall’s middle of the road model of democratic-welfare-
capitalism. a hayekian liberal would describe it as a collectivist’s itinerary 
for navigating “the road to serfdom”. a radical socialist would question 
whether any significant degree of equalization could ever be achieved 
without the effective abolition of competitive market capitalism.
This was the conclusion that Peter Townsend reached in his monumen-
tal study of Poverty in the United Kingdom, which was published nearly 
forty years ago. he began his enquiry with the assertion that “poverty can 
be defined objectively and applied consistently only in terms of the con-
cept of relative deprivation.” individuals and households were in poverty 
when “they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in 
the activities and have the living conditions which are customary, or at 
least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. 
Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average 
individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living 
patterns, customs and activities” (Townsend P., 1979: 31).
Townsend lists sixty indicators of “styles of living”, or “living patterns”, 
which include whether or not households have a refrigerator, the frequency 
with which families entertain relatives and friends and children have cooked 
breakfasts. he hypothesises that a particular point is “reached in descending 
the income scale” when “a significantly large number of families reduce 
more than proportionately their participation in the community’s style of liv-
ing. They drop out or are excluded. These income points can be identified as 
the poverty line” (Townsend P., 1979: 249). The “objective” status of these 
indicators has been called into question by a number of other social policy 
scholars, most notably by david Piachaud (Piachaud d., 1981: 421).
Townsend sets out three “alternative policies for dealing with large-
scale deprivation or poverty” which he describes as “a) conditional wel-
fare for the few; b)minimum rights for the many; and c) distributional 
justice for all” (Townsend P., 1979: 62). he chooses the “distributional” 
option, which he transforms into a radically egalitarian model of a socialist 
welfare state without once mentioning the “s” word. The structural pre-
conditions for implementing this model are “the destratification of society 
through economic, political and social reorganization and the equal distri-
bution and wider diffusion of all kinds of power and material resources” 
(Townsend P., 1979: 64). 
in his conclusion, Townsend outlines his policies for  “an effective assault 
on poverty”. They include the abolition of “excessive” wealth and income 
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with “a statutory definition of maximum possible earnings (and income) 
agreed” backed up by a “comprehensive incomes policy”. The “abolition of 
unemployment” would be achieved by introducing a “legally enforceable 
right to work” and “a corresponding obligation on the part of employers to 
provide alternative types of employment” (Townsend P., 1979: 926).
whatever we may think about the viability and desirability of these 
proposals, there can be no doubt that they could only be implemented if 
the radical structural preconditions that Townsend outlines were to be met. 
The likelihood that the electorates of any democratic societies would vote 
for structural changes of this order is, to say the least, remote.
Townsend, for his part, says little or nothing about their political and 
economic implications. implementing his policies would require an awe-
some concentration of coercive powers in the institutions of central gov-
ernment. all the institutions of civil society would have to be micro-man-
aged on a continuous basis.
No consideration whatever is given to the impact such policies would 
have on the processes of wealth creation without which there would be no re-
sources available for distribution or redistribution. all the historical evidence 
shows that, in highly centralised command economies, most of the population 
ends up with equal shares in relative poverty - relative, that is, to the standards 
of living they previously enjoyed in competitive market economies.
in the distant days of the Cold war, the most noteworthy difference that 
emerged between the nation states with competitive market economies and 
those with centralised command economies was that the former had to 
cope with the flow of refugees from command economies, while the latter 
built walls and watch-towers to prevent them leaving. in today’s newly 
emergent global economy, democratic-welfare-capitalist societies are still 
struggling to cope with the flow of refugees in search of freedom and a 
better standard of living.
CONCluSiON
Shortly before my formal retirement from academic life, i set out my views 
on the relative merits of competitive market economies, command econo-
mies and pluralist democratic-welfare-capitalist societies. Since then, we 
have all lived through a devastating global economic crisis in which the 
banking systems of the uSa, the uk and other leading capitalist nation 
states had to be rescued from bankruptcy by their governments or, more 
precisely, by massive injections of taxpayers’ money.
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most of us have learned that the processes of wealth creation cannot 
be safely left to the spontaneous operation of competitive market forces 
under “light touch” systems of financial regulation. Under such conditions, 
“booms” can turn into “busts” with alarming speed and the benefits of eco-
nomic growth do not “trickle down” to the poorest members of society.
Nevertheless, i remain committed to the values and the plurality of 
policy ends and means that can only be sustained and realised in demo-
cratic-welfare-capitalist societies. Since my views on these issues have not 
changed substantially over the past fifteen years, I can only conclude this 
essay by reiterating them in more or less verbatim form.
First, i believe that there is always trouble in store for the ordinary run 
of people when doctrines of moral improvement rise too high on the po-
litical agenda. From the individualist point of view, only total exposure to 
the disciplines of the competitive market will improve people’s characters. 
The collectivist premise is that only the discipline of statutory altruism 
will have this effect. Each of these prospective golden ages has its draw-
backs. in the individualist utopia we will quake with anticipatory guilt at 
the prospect of becoming dependent on anyone other than our kith or kin. 
in its collectivist counterpart we will be riven with anxiety lest any state 
or dependency, real or imagined, is left uncovered, undefined or unmet 
through government intervention.
Secondly, i believe that the best relationship between freedom and wel-
fare is found in societies where the institutional fault-lines are just flex-
ible enough to survive the subterranean currents of social change. when 
tremors strike a pluralist society – as they are bound to do from time to 
time – some institutional parts may totter and even crumble, but the rest 
will remain standing. in a unitary society every tremor has the potential 
impact of an earthquake. Therefore, it is essential that the various forms 
of institutional life making up the components of welfare pluralism should 
never converge, never unite and never be allowed to achieve any sort of 
quasi-hegelian synthesis.
Thirdly, i believe that, although we may never reach the “end of ideol-
ogy” in political thought, there are ample signs that the two great unitary 
ideologies of individualism and collectivism that have dominated welfare 
theory for the past two centuries are reaching the end of their useful lives 
as exclusive guides towards the creation of better and more equitable soci-
eties. we cannot invest all our hopes for a better future in the wealth gen-
erating powers of market individualism without unravelling the delicate 
strands of interdependency that hold civil societies together. Nor can we 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 01:33:26 |
22 rObErT PiNkEr
give unqualified support to the collectivist ideologies of equality, fraternity 
and co-operation. if we neglect the imperative of wealth creation, we will 
end with equal shares in poverty.
ideologies, like material goods and services, are subject to a law of 
diminishing returns. as with material goods, so with the doctrines of indi-
vidualism and collectivism – and for the same reason – no single political 
ideology can encompass or reconcile the diversity of human principles and 
desires that find expression in the institutions of a free society.
individualists must, therefore, ask themselves how far our basic 
freedoms can be guaranteed without some forms of collectivist welfare 
provision and redistribution. Collectivists, for their part, must recognise 
that highly centralised systems of state regulation, radically redistributive 
social policies and high levels of taxation can have seriously damaging 
effects on wealth creation, work incentives and personal freedoms. Viable 
compromises between individualist and collectivist views on the relation-
ships that ought to hold between freedom and welfare can only be reached 
in the mixed economies of democratic pluralist societies.
isaiah berlin put the case for pluralism in social theory and social life 
with exemplary force in pointing out that the great despotic visions of left 
and right are based on the belief that there is a fundamental unity underly-
ing all phenomena, deriving from a single universal purpose. all of these 
visions, whether they are conservative, liberal or socialist, are essentially 
determinist in character (berlin i., 1980: 150). i would only add that such 
visions are all infused with intimations of a golden age located either in 
times that never were or times that never will be (Pinker r., 1995a).
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